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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed and cross-appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judg-
ment of the Third District Court, and the appeal was transferred to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiffs Appeal 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted Defendants' motion for a directed 
verdict on Plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company's claim for lost profits for Defendants' 
early termination of the parties' distribution agreement, when Carlson presented evidence 
only of lost gross profits, not net profits, but Carlson's own pleadings and witnesses 
established beyond dispute that Carlson would have incurred significant costs in handling 
and distributing Squatters beer during the time for which Carlson seeks lost profits. 
An order granting a directed verdict is reviewed for correctness, and will be 
upheld when "reasonable minds would agree that no substantial evidence" supports the 
claim. Brehanvv. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict dismissing 
Carlson's claim under the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act, which did not go into 
effect until 1998, as the parties entered into their distribution agreement in 1994. 
Please see issue number one for the applicable standard of review. 
3. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding, under Rules 
402 and 403, evidence of the amount of sales of Defendants' goods made by Defendants' 
successor distributor in the five months immediately after termination. 
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A trial court's ruling under Rules 402 or 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, fflf 91, 95, 37 P.3d 1130. 
4. Whether Carlson is entitled to additional prejudgment interest. 
An award of prejudgment interest is reviewed for correctness. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 
2000 UT App 5, f 23, 994 P.2d 817. 
5. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Carlson's 
request for attorney fees, based on its determination that neither Carlson nor the 
Defendants were the "prevailing party," when Carlson lost on nearly every litigated issue, 
sought damages that were far in excess of what the jury awarded, rejected two offers of 
judgment, both of which were for more than the final verdict, and finally recovered about 
half of what it sought at trial. 
A trial court's ruling as to who is the prevailing party in an action is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,125, 40 P.3d 1119. 
Defendants9 Cross-Appeal 
1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to Carlson 
on its claim for a termination fee, when the parties' agreement specified that the fee 
would not be due until after Carlson paid Defendants' amounts owed on certain out-
standing invoices, and Carlson never paid Defendants, choosing instead to pay the 
amount owed into court. (Hr'g Tr., Oct. 30, 2002, R. 2432, at 30-31.) 
Please see issue four, above, for the standard of review. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Defendants the attorney 
fees they incurred in successfully defending against Carlson's Beer Industry Distribution 
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Act claim, when the Act expressly provides that the prevailing party is entitled to 
attorney fees. (R. 2138.) 
Please see issue five above for the standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are pertinent to the resolution of this appeal: 
1. Rules 401 through 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1 la-110(2)(a)(ii). 
These provisions are set forth in full at Exhibit A hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 15, 1994, Defendant Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. ("Squatters"1), 
and Carlson entered into a Distribution Agreement, whereby Carlson was to be the ex-
clusive distributor for Squatters beer. (Distribution Agreement, Exhibit F to Appellant's 
Brief.) The Agreement required Carlson to "use its best efforts and resources to sell and 
service" Squatters products, to "promote the sale" of Squatters beer by customers, and to 
"promote and protect [Squatters9] reputation and goodwill." (LI f^ 8(a).) The Agreement 
was automatically renewed each year unless a party notified the other party in writing of 
its election not to renew the Agreement at least 90 days prior to the end of the term. (Id 
Tf 3.) The Agreement stated that if Squatters chose not to renew the Agreement, Squatters 
1
 In early 2000, Salt Lake Brewing Co. joined forces with another local brewery, 
Schirf Brewing Company, to form Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Utah Brewers 
Cooperative, L.C. Salt Lake Brewing licensed its Squatters trademarks to Utah Brewers, 
and Utah Brewers took over the brewing, bottling, and distribution of Squatters beer. 
This brief refers to Salt Lake Brewing Co. and Utah Brewers Cooperative collectively as 
"Squatters." 
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was obligated to pay Carlson a "termination fee" of .75 times Carlson's gross profits for 
the preceding twelve months. (Id f 4(d).) Importantly, the Agreement expressly stated 
that the termination fee would not be due until "thirty days from [Carlson's] payment (if 
any) and delivery to [Squatters]" of any outstanding obligations to Squatters. (Id.) 
In the summer of 2000, dissatisfied with Carlson's consistent failure to use its best 
efforts to promote Squatters draft beer, Squatters decided to distribute its products 
through M&M Distributing. (See Trial Tr., vol. II, R. 2428, at 367-68.) Therefore, on 
July 28, 2000, Squatters informed Carlson that it was terminating the Agreement, effec-
tive July 31. (PL's Trial Ex. 3.) At the time, Squatters offered to pay a termination fee as 
a means of resolving the relationship. (Id.) Carlson, however, responded with a letter 
demanding that Squatters cease selling its own beer, threatening litigation, and claiming 
that Squatters was liable to pay Carlson a whopping $590,065.94 in damages, including a 
termination fee of $351,842, $222,707 in alleged lost profits, and more than $15,000 for 
an alleged wrongful price increase in May 2000. (Defs.' Trial Ex. 3.) 
Squatters refused to accede to Carlson's excessive demands, and on August 4, 
2000, Carlson initiated this action. (Complaint, R. 1-36.) Among other things, Carlson 
alleged in its complaint that "[a]lmost all of Plaintiffs employees receive a portion of 
their pay in the form of commissions based on beer sales" and that Carlson was suffering 
damages in the form of "losses related to its' employees' inability to recover commis-
sions." (Id. Yl 36, 45, R. 6, 8.) Carlson simultaneously moved for a temporary restrain-
ing order, asking the trial court (the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley) to force Squatters to 
continue distributing its products through Carlson. Judge Medley denied the motion, 
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finding that Carlson had not demonstrated irreparable harm. (Hr'g Tr., Aug. 9, 2000, R. 
2426, at 35-39; Ruling, R. 219-22.) 
When the Agreement was terminated, Carlson then owed Squatters a net of 
$12,992.74 for outstanding invoices. (PL's Trial Ex. 34.) But Carlson did not pay this 
amount to Squatters. Instead, approximately six months later, on January 25, 2001, 
Carlson simply paid that amount into the Third District Court. (R. 371.) Carlson never 
sought an order authorizing the deposit, nor did Squatters stipulate to the deposit. 
Squatters did not receive this money until August 23, 2002, after the trial. (R. 1959-61.) 
On February 16, 2001, Carlson filed an amended complaint, seeking (1) lost 
profits damages for Squatters' early termination of the Distribution Agreement; (2) dam-
ages due to an alleged improper price increase; (3) damages for losses related to Carl-
son's inability to sell perishable goods; (4) damages for Carlson's alleged inability to 
recover certain receivables and equipment; (5) a termination fee under the Agreement; 
(6) damages for Squatters' alleged violation of Carlson's purported trademark rights; 
(7) damages for Squatters' alleged violation of the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-lla-101 et seq; and (8) injunctive relief. (See Amended Com-
plaint, R. 451-64.) Squatters denied liability and counterclaimed for damages for Carl-
son's breach of its duties under the Agreement to use its best efforts and resources to 
promote and sell Squatters beer. (Answer and Counterclaim, R. 568-612.) Squatters also 
stated that the termination fee, if due, would be only $290,617.64. (Id. at R. 588.) 
-5-
On March 12, 2001, in an attempt to resolve the matter, Squatters served a Rule 68 
Offer of Judgment on Carlson, in the amount of $300,000. (R. 2149-50.) Carlson 
refused this offer. 
On June 25, 2001, Squatters and Carlson entered into a stipulation in which 
Squatters agreed that the Distribution Agreement entitled Carlson to a termination fee. 
(Stipulation, R. 776-77.) The parties also agreed that because Squatters had breached the 
Agreement by terminating Carlson, Carlson was entitled to recover its "net profits" for 
the period of August 1, 2000 (the termination date), to December 14, 2000 (the Agree-
ment's expiration date). (Id.) The stipulation did not address whether the fee would be 
due immediately or after Carlson paid Squatters the unpaid invoice amount ($12,992.74). 
During the course of the litigation, Carlson consistently overstated the amount of 
the termination fee it was allegedly owed. In December 2000, in answers to inter-
rogatories, Carlson claimed (as it had in its initial demand) that the termination fee was 
$351,842. (Defs.5 Trial Ex. 9, at 5.) In November 2001, Carlson, tacitly admitting that 
its prior demand was excessive, stated that it had "recalculated" the termination fee to be 
$323,096. (Defs.5 Trial Ex. 10.) In January 2002, in response to Squatters5 second set of 
interrogatories, Carlson tacitly admitted that its corrected number was also excessive and 
swore under oath that the termination fee was $319,952.66. (Defs.5 Trial Ex. 11, at 4.) 
On February 12, 2002, Squatters made another Offer of Judgment, this time for 
$405,000, excluding attorney fees. (R. 2152-53.) Carlson again refused. 
Several months before the trial, Squatters filed a motion in limine, asking the trial 
court to exclude testimony of Richard Carlson, Carlson's president, on lost profits. (R. 
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1268-80.) Squatters pointed out that Mr. Carlson's testimony was inadequate as a matter 
of law because Carlson was only entitled to recover lost net profits, but Mr. Carlson's 
testimony was directed only at Carlson's lost gross profits. (R. 1274-75.) Squatters 
pointed out that under Sawyers v. FMA Leasing, 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), a party 
seeking lost profits must do more than show its lost gross profits; the party must also 
introduce evidence of costs that would be incurred in producing those gross profits, so the 
trier of fact can calculate the lost net profits. If the party fails to introduce such evidence, 
there is an insufficient basis to award lost net profits, and the claim fails as a matter of 
law. Carlson responded by claiming that it was not required to produce evidence of its 
costs, because it had no such costs; Carlson claimed that its gross profits and its net 
profits were the same. (R. 1304-06.) The trial court did not grant Squatters' motion but 
instead allowed Carlson to present its lost profits claim as it deemed appropriate. 
Also before trial, Carlson filed a "motion to admit evidence," in which it sought to 
introduce evidence that in August through December 2000, the first five months after 
M&M Distributing took over Squatters beer, sales of the beer were down compared to the 
same time period for the preceding year. (R. 1409-24.) Carlson sought to use this evid-
ence in response to Squatters' "best efforts" claim. The trial court denied the motion 
under Rules 402 and 403, concluding that the evidence was not relevant to the best efforts 
claim, and that any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the 
potential for confusion, delay, and waste of the court's time. (Order Correcting Record 
on Appeal, Exhibit B hereto.) 
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The trial began on July 30, 2002. Richard Carlson, Carlson's primary witness, 
claimed that as a result of the early termination of the Distribution Agreement, Carlson 
sustained lost profits of $182,442.50, but Carlson refused to reveal the amount of the 
costs it would have incurred in earning those profits. (Trial Tr. I, R. 2427, at 70-76.) 
Instead, Carlson presented evidence only of lost gross profits: Carlson claimed that it 
would have sold a certain number of cases and kegs of Squatters beer from August 1 
through December 14, 2000, and came up with its lost profits figure by simply multiply-
ing the projected case and keg sales by its gross margin (i.e., the difference between 
Carlson's sales price to customers and the purchase price it paid to Squatters). (See id.) 
In an attempt to justify its refusal to produce evidence of the costs Carlson would 
have incurred in selling Squatters beer during the termination period, Mr. Carlson 
claimed that Carlson had no such costs, because no costs were supposedly "eliminated" 
when Carlson lost the Squatters brand. (Id at 74-75.) However, Mr. Carlson admitted on 
cross-examination that when Carlson sold Squatters beer, Carlson incurred commission 
costs, advertising and promotion costs, insurance costs (based on sales receipts), special 
storage and handling costs for kegs, costs for gasoline, oil, and maintenance, and other 
costs. (Id at 108-112; Trial Tr. II, R. 2428, at 186-87, 215-23.) Brett Birt, a Carlson 
employee, also testified that he received nearly one-fourth of his salary through sales 
commissions, which were paid to everyone in his department. (Trial Tr. II, at 275.) 
Nevertheless, Carlson steadfastly clung to its position that it had no obligation to present 
evidence as to the amount of the commissions that would have been paid on Squatters 
sales, or the other costs Carlson would have incurred in selling Squatters beer. 
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Accordingly, at the close of Carlson's case, Squatters moved for a directed verdict 
on the lost profits claim. (Trial Tr. Ill, R. 2429, at 399-413.) Judge Medley granted the 
motion, concluding that "reasonable minds cannot differ" that Carlson would have 
incurred costs in selling Squatters beer during the termination period. (Trial Tr. IV, R. 
2430, at 539-43.) Because Carlson failed to present evidence as to the extent of these 
costs, Judge Medley reasoned, Carlson's claim for lost net profits was "highly speculative 
because the amount of Plaintiff s lost net profits is not determinable from the evidence." 
(Order, Aug. 19, 2002, R. 1953, Appellant's Br. Ex. C.) Thus, Judge Medley concluded 
that under Sawyers, Carlson's lost profits claim failed as a matter of law. 
Squatters also obtained directed verdicts on two of Carlson's other claims: its 
trademark claim and its Beer Industry Distribution Act claim. On the Distribution Act 
claim, Judge Medley held that the Act did not apply to the Distribution Agreement be-
cause that agreement was entered into in 1994, while the Act did not go into effect until 
1998. (Id.) Judge Medley rejected Carlson's argument that the automatic extension of 
the Agreement each year on December 14 subjected the Agreement to the Act. Squatters 
also asked the trial court for a directed verdict on Carlson's termination fee claim, 
because Carlson had not paid the unpaid invoices to Squatters, which was required before 
Squatters was obligated to pay the termination fee. (R. 1688-1701.) The trial court den-
ied this motion, concluding that Squatters had waived that provision of the contract be-
cause Squatters had not objected after Carlson paid the funds into court. (Trial Tr. Ill, R. 
2430, at 398-99.) 
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In closing arguments, Carlson asked the jury to award at least $309,000 for the 
termination fee (Trial Tr. V, R. 2432, at 796), plus additional damages for an allegedly 
improper price increase in May 2000. Carlson also asked the jury to deny Squatters' 
claim for Carlson's breach of the Distribution Agreement's best efforts provision. Con-
versely, Squatters argued that the termination fee was no more than $294,022.56, that 
Squatters had not breached the Agreement by raising its prices, and asked the jury to 
award $20,990.76 on the "best efforts" counterclaim. (Id at 799-820.) The jury did 
exactly as Squatters asked: it awarded only $294,022.56 on the termination fee, denied 
Carlson's other claims, and awarded Squatters $20,990.76 on the counterclaim. (Verdict, 
R. 1936-37, Appellant's Br. Ex. B.) Thus, the net verdict for Carlson was only 
$273,031.80, significantly less than half of what Carlson originally demanded, barely 
over half (53%) of the $512,000-plus that Carlson had sought at trial, and significantly 
less than either of the offers of judgment Squatters had submitted. 
After the conclusion of the trial, Carlson moved for an award of prejudgment 
interest and for attorney fees, claiming it was the prevailing party. (R. 1962-2132.) 
Squatters opposed Carlson's requests and itself moved for attorney fees as the prevailing 
party, as Squatters had prevailed on every issue that was disputed at trial, except possibly 
the issue of when a termination fee was due. (R. 2133-2305.) The trial court awarded 
prejudgment interest on the termination fee dating from February 24, 2001, despite 
Squatters' contention that the Distribution Agreement did not require it to pay a termin-
ation fee until Carlson paid the outstanding invoices, which did not happen until after 
trial; the court concluded that Squatters had waived its right to receive the payment 
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because it did not expressly object when Carlson paid the funds into court. (Prejudgment 
Interest Order, R. 2350-56, Appellant's Br. Ex. E.) Regarding attorney fees, the trial 
court held that neither party was the prevailing party, based on the number of claims 
presented, the importance of each claim, and the outcome of each claim. (Attorney Fee 
Order, R. 2362-72, Appellant's Br. Ex. D.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
None of the issues raised on Carlson's appeal has any merit. 
First, Judge Medley ruled correctly when he granted Squatters' motion for a 
directed verdict on Carlson's claim for lost profits. Utah law is clear (and Carlson does 
not dispute) that a party is entitled only to lost net profits, not lost gross profits, and that a 
party seeking lost profits must introduce evidence of the costs that would have been in-
curred in generating the lost income, to give the trier of fact a basis to calculate lost net 
profits. Carlson, however, steadfastly refused to introduce evidence of the amount of 
costs it would have incurred if it had continued to sell Squatters beer during the four-and-
a-half months after the Distribution Agreement was terminated, even though Carlson's 
pleadings and Carlson's witnesses both established beyond doubt that Carlson would 
have incurred such costs. Without evidence of the amount of those costs, the jury would 
have had to speculate as to the amount of Carlson's lost net profits. Thus, the trial court 
correctly held that Carlson presented insufficient evidence to support a lost profits award. 
The trial court also correctly dismissed Carlson's claim under the Utah Beer 
Industry Distribution Act. First, the claim failed on the merits, for the same reasons that 
the lost profits claim failed - because Carlson refused to present evidence that was 
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legally sufficient to support a damages award. Second, the claim failed because the 
statute did not go into effect until 1998, while the parties entered into the Distribution 
Agreement in 1994. That the Agreement had an initial one-year term, with automatic 
annual renewals, does not subject the Agreement to the statute, as the renewals merely 
extended the term of the original agreement and did not create a new one. In fact, 
Carlson's Amended Complaint even alleges that Squatters breached the Agreement the 
parties entered into in 1994, which defeats any claim Carlson chooses to make now that 
the Agreement was actually reached some time after 1998. 
The trial court also correctly excluded evidence of beer sales by M&M 
Distributing, Squatters' successor distributor, on Squatters' claim for Carlson's breach of 
its contractual "best efforts" obligations. The only relevant issue was whether Carlson 
used its best efforts to promote, advertise, and sell Squatters beer, and sales made by a 
different distributor, in the first few months that it carried the product, simply have no 
bearing on that issue. At the very least, Judge Medley certainly did not abuse his dis-
cretion in concluding that introduction of that evidence would require Squatters to present 
rebuttal evidence, and that the probative value of M&M's subsequent performance was 
not worth the confusion and delay it would engender. 
The trial court also refused to award Carlson additional prejudgment interest. 
Carlson insists that it is entitled to interest on an additional $3,404.92, but the trial court 
properly concluded that, based on Carlson's constantly shifting position as to what it was 
owed on the termination fee, Carlson cannot truthfully claim that the amount of the fee 
was "fixed" at the amount the jury ultimately determined. 
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Finally, the trial court correctly held that Carlson was not the prevailing party for 
attorney fee purposes. Carlson obtained barely half the judgment it sought, and it pre-
vailed on only two largely uncontested issues. Further, Carlson rejected two offers of 
judgment, both of which exceeded the verdict Carlson obtained at trial. Squatters was 
successful on nearly every issue that it litigated, defeating Carlson's attempts to obtain an 
injunction and to recover an excessive termination fee and excessive lost profits, and 
itself recovering every dollar it sought on its counterclaim. Utah law gives trial courts 
flexibility in determining who is the prevailing party, and this case provides a perfect 
example of why such flexibility is appropriate. Further, Utah law is also clear that a trial 
court's determination will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, and Judge 
Medley's ruling on the issue is the very model for careful, thorough judicial analysis. 
On Squatters' counterclaim, the Court should rule that Carlson was not entitled to 
any prejudgment interest on its termination fee claim. The Distribution Agreement stated 
that Squatters had no obligation to pay the termination fee until thirty days after Carlson 
paid all outstanding invoices owed to Squatters, and Carlson never paid this amount. The 
trial court ruled that Squatters waived its right to have the invoices paid because Squatters 
did not expressly object to the failure to pay Squatters, but the law is clear that Squatters 
had no duty to remind Carlson of its own contractual obligations. 
The Court should also remand to award Squatters the fees it incurred on the 
Distribution Act claim. The statute provides that the prevailing party on such a claim is 
entitled to fees, and there is no dispute that Squatters prevailed completely on that claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
PART ONE 
CARLSON'S APPEAL 
Carlson's case represents a classic example of overreaching. After Squatters term-
inated the Distribution Agreement, Carlson had one or two legitimate claims. And Squat-
ters repeatedly attempted to take care of those claims by offering judgment. But that did 
not satisfy Carlson. Instead, Carlson demanded a termination fee far in excess of the 
amount actually owed; sought a windfall by claiming a right to lost gross profits without 
taking an offset for costs; and pursued several other claims, all of which were found to be 
meritless. Carlson even refused to pay Squatters the money Carlson owed when the 
Agreement was terminated, a mere $13,000, even though the Agreement clearly required 
such a payment before Squatters was required to pay a termination fee. 
The outcome of Carlson's claims was exactly as it should have been: Carlson 
received only the termination fee that Squatters claimed was proper; Carlson's attempt to 
hold Squatters liable for gross profits was rebuffed, and each of Carlson's other claims 
failed. Meanwhile, Squatters was awarded every dollar it sought on its counterclaim. 
And in light of the fact that Squatters succeeded on nearly every claim, Judge Medley 
held that Carlson was not the prevailing party. 
Carlson now continues its vendetta against Squatters through this appeal. But 
once again, none of the claims Carlson raises on its appeal has any merit whatsoever. 
Accordingly, the Court should reject each of the Carlson's claims of error. 
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A. The trial court correctly granted Squatters' motion for a directed verdict on 
Carlson's claim for lost profits, because Carlson presented evidence only of 
its lost gross profits, not its lost net profits. 
During the trial, Carlson presented evidence of the gross profits it claimed it 
would have earned from August 1, 2000, through December 14, 2000, if it had continued 
to distribute and sell Squatters beer. Carlson, however, consciously refused to demon-
strate the amount of costs it would have incurred in handling and selling the product. 
Accordingly, there was no basis for the jury to calculate or award Carlson's lost net pro-
fits. As Judge Medley recognized, "[UJnder the present state of the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, reasonable minds cannot differ that the Plaintiff 
has failed to prove lost net profits. Plaintiff has shown gross income and that costs were 
incurred in producing gross income up to the date of termination, but not any specifics 
from which lost net profits can be determined" (R. 1954 (emphasis added).)2 Thus, 
Judge Medley did not err in granting a directed verdict on Carlson's lost profits claim. 
In Utah, a party claiming lost profits may recover only net profits lost as a result of 
the alleged breach, not lost gross profits. E.g., Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 
773, 774-75 (Utah 1986). Awarding gross profits would give the plaintiff a windfall by 
putting him or her in a better position than if the contract had been performed. Con-
sequently, a party wishing to obtain lost profits must introduce evidence not only of the 
gross profits that would have been earned had the contract been performed, but also of 
the costs that would have been incurred to obtain those gross profits, so the trier of fact 
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can determine the plaintiffs lost net profits. See id Where a plaintiff fails to present 
evidence of costs, the fact finder has no basis to determine lost net profits with reasonable 
certainty, and lost profits are unavailable as a matter of law. Id 
Carlson admits both that Utah law requires evidence of lost net profits and that it 
presented no evidence of the specific costs that it would have incurred in selling Squatters 
beer during the early termination period. Instead, Carlson claims that it need not present 
such evidence because there supposedly were no such costs. Carlson is wrong. 
On its face, it is absurd for Carlson to claim that it would have purchased, stored, 
promoted, sold, and delivered hundreds of kegs and thousands of cases of beer over a 
four-and-a-half-month period without incurring any marginal costs. More importantly, 
Carlson's claim is belied by Carlson's own pleadings and by the trial testimony of its 
president, Richard Carlson, and its former draft beer manager, Brett Birt, which establish 
that Carlson would have incurred commission costs, advertising and promotion costs, 
insurance costs, special handling costs, equipment maintenance costs, and other costs in 
distributing Squatters beer. 
1. The undisputed evidence at trial established that Carlson would have 
incurred several types of costs in handling and selling Squatters beer. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Carlson admitted that when Carlson made sales of 
Squatters beer during 1999 and 2000 (the period immediately before the termination), 
Carlson had to "spend some money" to make those sales, "besides just buying the prod-
2
 Carlson thus misrepresents Judge Medley's ruling when Carlson states that Judge 
Medley ruled "that there can never be a situation in which there are no costs attributable 
to the generation of a particular item of gross profit." (Appellant's Br. at 22.) 
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uct" (Trial Tr. II, R. 2428, at 201, 202.) Mr. Carlson also admitted that in calculating 
the profit from sales of Squatters beer, one had to consider more than mere markup; one 
also had to consider "other costs of doing business." (Id at 215.) In addition to these 
general admissions, the pleadings and evidence reveal that Carlson incurred the following 
types of costs in selling Squatters beer: 
a. Commission Costs. 
In its amended complaint, Carlson admitted that it pays commissions on sales of 
Squatters beer: 
Almost all of Plaintiffs employees receive a portion of their pay in the 
form of commissions based on beer sales. 
(Amended Complaint ^f36, R. 456 (emphasis added).) This allegation constitutes a 
judicial admission, binding for all purposes in the litigation. See Baldwin v. Vantage 
Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). Consequently, this allegation is itself enough to 
establish as a matter of law that Carlson incurred commission costs on its sales of 
Squatters beer, and that Carlson would have continued to incur commission costs on 
Squatters sales had Carlson continued to sell Squatters during the termination period. 
In addition, Mr. Carlson's trial testimony further established that Carlson's drivers 
and sales personnel are paid in part on a commission basis: 
Q: And in fact, all your drivers are paid a base and a bonus commission; 
isn't that true? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the bonus commission is based on a target amount or dollars per 
month based on sales, correct? 
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A: Sales, performance, many other issues. 
Q: And the sales people are also paid on a commission basis, correct? 
A: On a bonus commission, yes. 
Q: And that's based on sales? 
A: Sometimes. 
Q: And pretty much most of the people of the whole operation get some 
kind of commission based on sales; isn't that true? 
A: They get a bonus, most people. 
(Trial Tr. II, R. 2482, at 219.) Indeed, Brett Birt, a former Carlson employee, candidly 
admitted that about one quarter of his salary came from commissions, and that everyone 
in his department was paid commissions. (Id, at 275.) 
Finally, when Carlson was trying to obtain a temporary restraining order to force 
Squatters to continue selling through Carlson, Carlson was not shy at all about claiming 
that its employees were receiving commissions through the sale of Squatters beer: 
Almost all of Carlson's employees have also been irreparably harmed by 
the loss of the Squatters Beer distributorship. Part of these employees' pay 
is attributable to commissions on beer sales. The sales people, delivery 
people, merchandising personnel, warehouse employees, and managers 
who received commissions based on the sales of Squatters Beer will lose 
this income. 
(Affidavit of Richard Carlson, Defs.' Trial Ex. 24, at 9, \ 37.) 
Thus, the record demonstrates that had Carlson continued to sell Squatters during 
the four-and-a-half months after the Agreement was terminated, Carlson would have paid 
a portion of the money it received on the sale of Squatters beer not only to its sales staff 
and drivers, but to "[a]lmost all of Plaintiff s employees." (Amended Complaint «J 36.) 
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b. Advertising and Promotion Costs. 
The Distribution Agreement expressly required Carlson to use its "best efforts and 
resources" to "promote the sale of [Squatters] products by Customers" and to use its "best 
efforts" to maintain "a professional and comprehensive marketing, advertising, and 
promotional plan to sell the [Squatters] products and to promote the purchase and sale of 
[Squatters] products by Customers." (Distribution Agreement f^ 8(a), (c).) And Carlson 
admitted that it incurred substantial costs in so doing. Carlson admitted that it "did 
promotions in relation to Squatters," including promotions at the Outdoor Retailers 
Convention and the E Center, and that Carlson incurred advertising costs for other pro-
motions. (Trial Tr. II, R. 2482, at 221-23.) In fact, Mr. Carlson stated that Carlson spent 
a "significant" amount of money promoting Squatters beer: "a million [dollars] over five 
years." (Id at 223.) Carlson also admitted that its overall advertising expenditures went 
from $25,000 in 1999 to $200,000 in 2000, an eight-fold increase. (Id at 221.) 
Once again, the evidence is undisputed that Carlson incurred advertising and 
promotion costs in selling Squatters beer, and that Carlson would have continued to incur 
such costs had it continued to sell Squatters beer from August through December 2000. 
Anything less, especially during the start of the 2000-01 ski season, would have been a 
breach of Carlson's contractual obligation to use its "best efforts and resources" to 
"promote" and "advertise" Squatters beer. 
c. Liability Insurance. 
Mr. Carlson testified that Carlson maintains general liability insurance, and that 
the price of that insurance was based on "the amount of sales." (Trial Tr. II, R. 2428, at 
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218.) In other words, out of every dollar Carlson received on the sales of its products, 
including Squatters beer, a certain amount was paid to Carlson's insurer. Therefore, if 
Carlson had really sold $182,000 worth of Squatters beer from August through December 
2000, Carlson would have been required to pay a portion of that money to its insurer. 
But once again, it is pure speculation as to how much would have been paid, because 
Carlson refused to offer that evidence at trial. 
d. Special Keg Storage and Handling Costs. 
Squatters accounted for forty-six percent of Carlson's total keg business (Id. at 
116), and Mr. Carlson testified at trial that Carlson incurred a number of special costs 
associated with its keg business, including but not limited to providing financing to 
retailers (id at 215), providing equipment and servicing (id), removal of empty kegs and 
related equipment (id. at 215-16), handling deposits (id. at 216), different refrigeration 
and temperature controls (id.), capping equipment and maintenance (id), installing tap 
equipment and lines (id. at 107-08, 216-17), cleaning taps and lines (id. at 216), and 
supplies for maintaining taps (id at 217). Yet again, however, Carlson refused to present 
evidence as to the extent of any of these costs. 
2. Because Carlson failed to present evidence of the amount of costs it 
would have incurred in selling Squatters beer, Carlson failed to meet 
its burden of establishing lost net profits to a reasonable certainty. 
The evidence cited above, none of which was specifically controverted, is more 
than sufficient to establish as a matter of law that Carlson would have incurred costs if 
Carlson had continued to sell Squatters beer from August through December 2000. 
Indeed, the pleadings and evidence regarding commissions is itself fatal to Carlson's 
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claim. It was Carlson's burden, as the plaintiff, to establish the amount of its damages -
including lost net profits — to a reasonable certainty. But the jury would have been 
required to speculate on the commission amount - would commissions have amounted to 
one percent of gross sales? five percent? ten percent? And because the jury had no way 
to reasonably calculate commission costs, any determination of Carlson's lost profits net 
of those costs would also have been pure speculation. The same reasoning applies to the 
each of the other costs Carlson would have incurred in selling Squatters beer. 
Moreover, evidence of Carlson's commission payments demonstrates that the case 
upon which Carlson relies, Distillers Distributing Corp. v. J.C. Millett Co., 310 F.2d 162 
(9th Cir. 1962), actually supports Judge Medley's ruling. In Distillers Distributing, the 
plaintiff there correctly deducted sales commissions in reaching its lost profits figure: 
The trial court then determined that appellee was entitled to a markup from 
the proceeds of 2350 cases over the cost of acquisition of $6.08 per case or 
$14,288.00. From this figure was subtracted $2,414.67 (discounts to 
purchasers) and $3,957.77 {commissions to salesman), leaving a balance of 
$7,915.56. 
Id at 163 (emphasis added). In other words, Distillers Distributing recognizes that in 
computing lost net profits, at a minimum, commissions paid to the sellers of the products 
at issue must be deducted from the gross profits. Carlson did not even bother to deduct 
those costs, much less the other costs discussed above. 
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3. In the face of the undisputed evidence that Carlson incurred costs in 
handling and selling Squatters beer, Carlson's unsupported and con-
elusory denial that such costs existed is not enough to avoid a 
directed verdict. 
In light of the undisputed evidence set forth above, it is disingenuous for Carlson 
to claim on appeal that a directed verdict was improper simply because Mr. Carlson 
claimed that no costs were "eliminated" as a result of the loss of the Squatters account. 
Indeed, while Carlson may not technically have an obligation to marshal evidence, it is 
incomprehensible how Carlson can ignore the overwhelming evidence in the record of its 
costs in selling Squatters beer, or attempt to explain such evidence away by dismissing it 
as a mere issue of "credibility." (See Appellant's Br. at 25.) 
First, Mr. Carlson's testimony that no costs were "eliminated" completely misses 
the point. The issue is not whether costs were subsequently eliminated after Carlson lost 
the Squatters account, but rather whether costs would have been incurred if Carlson had 
sold Squatters beer over the period in question. And as shown above, if Carlson had sold 
Squatters beer throughout the termination period, Carlson at a minimum would have 
incurred costs for commissions, advertising, insurance, and storage and handling. Carl-
son wants the projected income it supposedly would have earned on continued sales of 
Squatters beer during the termination period, but Carlson does not want to be burdened 
by the expenses that would have been incurred as well. 
Second, Mr. Carlson's conclusory, self-serving denial is simply not enough to 
avoid a directed verdict in light of the other undisputed evidence in the record. A 
directed verdict is proper when "reasonable minds would agree that no substantial evid-
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ence" supports an essential element of the plaintiffs claim. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). To defeat such a motion, the plaintiff must show that 
"there is a reasonable basis in the evidence" for a verdict in his favor. Id. In the present 
case, because Carlson bore the burden of proving damages to a reasonable certainty, the 
issue before Judge Medley was whether the evidence in the trial record at the close of 
Carlson's case was sufficient to enable a jury to determine the amount of net profits 
Carlson lost as a result of its inability to sell Squatters beer from August 1 through 
December 14, 2000. And in addressing this issue, it would have been error for Judge 
Medley to ignore the undisputed evidence of commission costs, advertising and pro-
motion costs, insurance costs, and the other costs. 
Mr. Carlson's conclusory testimony that no costs were "saved" or "eliminated" is 
irrelevant and is insufficient to support a judgment in Carlson's favor. Moreover, be-
cause the evidence of Carlson's costs came from Carlson's own pleadings and Carlson's 
own witnesses, Carlson cannot be allowed to get to a jury simply by having Mr. Carlson 
contradict himself on the stand. Cf Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) 
(in analogous context of summary judgment, where the plaintiffs own deposition tes-
timony establishes a fact fatal to his or her case, the plaintiff cannot avoid an adverse 
judgment merely by testifying to the contrary in an affidavit). 
Finally, Carlson cannot complain of losing its lost profits claim. Squatters had 
stipulated that Carlson was entitled to its lost profits, and Carlson knew, months before 
trial, that Squatters was contending that Carlson's lost gross profits evidence was legally 
insufficient to sustain a judgment. (See Motion in Limine, Feb. 27, 2002, R. 1268-80.) 
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Yet, attempting to squeeze Squatters for every possible dollar, Carlson refused to show 
how much it would have paid in commissions, how much it would have paid in adver-
tising, how much it paid for insurance, etc. Carlson chose to gamble on its "gross profits 
equals net profits" argument, and Carlson rightfully lost. Carlson therefore has no one 
but itself to blame that its lost profits claim failed. 
"[Reasonable minds would agree," based on the evidence presented in Carlson's 
case-in-chief, that Carlson would have incurred some costs in selling Squatters beer from 
August though December 2000. And it is undisputed that Carlson presented no evidence 
of the amount of those costs. Accordingly, under the rule of Sawyers v. FMA Leasing, 
there was no basis upon which the jury or the trial court could have awarded lost net prof-
its, and the trial court had no choice but to grant Squatters5 motion for directed verdict. 
B. The trial court correctly dismissed Carlson's claim under the Beer Industry 
Distribution Act. 
1. Because Carlson failed to present evidence of its lost profits, its 
claim under the Act fails for insufficient evidence. 
Carlson's Beer Industry Distribution Act argument is simply a red herring, as 
Carlson admits that its Distribution Act claim merely duplicates its contract claim: 
In addition, the remedies Carlson sought under the Distribution Act, 
damages and attorney fees, were the same remedies to which it was entitled 
for breach of the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the provisions of the 
Distribution Act Carlson sought to apply gave Carlson no greater rights, 
and defendants no greater obligations or liabilities, than did the Dis-
tribution Agreement, and were purely procedural changes to the legal 
machinery for enforcement of Carlson's contractual rights. 
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(Appellant's Br. at 29 (emphasis added).) Carlson's claim under the Distribution Act 
fails for the same reason that its claim for breach of contract failed: Because Carlson 
failed to present sufficient evidence of its lost net profits. 
2. The Distribution Act does not apply because it was not in effect 
when the parties entered into the Distribution Agreement in 1994. 
Additionally, the trial court correctly dismissed the Distribution Act claim because 
the Distribution Agreement at issue was entered into in 1994, while the Act did not go 
into effect until 1998. As Carlson concedes, Utah law is clear that a statute cannot be 
applied retroactively to a contractual transaction that was entered into before the statute 
was adopted. (See Appellant's Br, at 26 (citing Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).) 
Carlson is flatly wrong when it claims that the statute applies because the parties 
entered into a new agreement each time the Distribution Agreement was automatically 
extended. Carlson's reliance on AMCO Insurance Co. v. Lang, 420 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 
1988), is misplaced because AMCO does not hold that any renewal or extension of the 
term of a contract creates a new contract, subjecting the parties to any laws that have 
been passed during the preceding contract term. In fact, that was not even an issue in 
AMCO: In AMCO, the statute at issue went into effect on October 1, 1985, and the 
accident at issue took place on October 24, 1985, barely three weeks later. See id at 896-
97. There was neither a "renewal" nor an "extension" in the intervening three weeks. 
Thus, the issue was not the effect of a renewal or extension, but rather whether the 
statutory change went into effect immediately. See id at 898. 
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Indeed, AMCO itself recognizes that a renewal may amount to nothing more than 
an extension of the original contract, rather than the creation of a new one, and that 
"[wjhether the payment of a renewal premium results in the extension or continuation of 
the original policy or the formation of a new and independent contract depends primarily 
on the intention of the parties as ascertained from the policy itself" Id. at 898 (emphasis 
added). See also 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 443 ("In the last analysis, however, whether 
the renewal is a new and independent contract, or an extension or continuation of the 
original contract, depends primarily on the intention of the parties as ascertained from the 
instrument itself."). 
In a case nearly identical to the present one, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
held that a statutory change passed before a renewal/extension date did not affect the 
renewed/extended contract. See Beer Wholesalers, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 426 
N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). In Beer Wholesalers, a former distributor sued 
Miller, alleging breach of contract and violation of Minnesota's Beer Brewers and 
Wholesalers Act. The Act was passed five years after the parties had entered into their 
distributorship agreement. Like the agreement in the present case, the agreement stated 
that it would automatically renew unless either party gave written notice of nonrenewal. 
The court refused to allow retroactive application on the grounds that such application 
would unconstitutionally infringe the contracting parties' rights and obligations. 
As these authorities amply demonstrate, Carlson and Squatters did not enter into a 
"new" contract every year. Instead, the plain language of the Distribution Agreement 
provided that the agreement would automatically be "extended" every year unless one of 
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the parties took affirmative action to terminate the agreement. (Distribution Agreement 
Tf 3(b), Appellant's Br. Ex. F.) Moreover, Carlson has judicially admitted that the annual 
renewals merely extended the term of the original agreement rather than created a new 
agreement: Carlson's amended complaint alleges that the parties "entered into" the 
Agreement in December 1994, that the "initial term" of the Agreement was one year, that 
the "term of the Agreement has been extended through and including December 14, 
2000," and that Squatters breached that Agreement. (See Amended Complaint Tflj 8, 13, 
14, 41, R. 453, 457.) Once again, Carlson is bound by its own allegations and 
admissions. 
In other words, as Judge Medley reasoned, the parties agreed upon their respective 
rights and obligations in December 1994, and the Agreement required those rights and 
obligations to remain in effect, unchanged, until one of the parties affirmatively acted to 
change them. There was certainly no new "offer" or "acceptance" by either party after 
December 1994. Cf Yoder v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 814 A.2d 229, 233 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (renewal does not constitute new agreement because no new offer or 
acceptance were made). Accordingly, the agreement that was in effect between the 
parties in July 2000 was the same one that had been reached in December 1994, and the 
Distribution Act cannot be applied to that agreement. 
The Court can also reject Carlson's attempt to claim that the Distribution Act 
merely created procedural, and not substantive, obligations. The Act imposed numerous 
substantive duties on Squatters that did not exist in 1994. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-
11 a-103, -105, -108. That some of these obligations were similar to obligations the 
parties had already undertaken in the Distribution Agreement does not change the fact 
that the Act had a substantive, as opposed to merely a procedural, effect. 
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C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of M&M's 
initial sales of Squatters beer. 
Unable to mount a direct challenge to the jury's unanimous verdict awarding 
Squatters damages on its "best efforts" counterclaim, Carlson attempts to attack that 
verdict indirectly by claiming that the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding 
sales of Squatters beer made by M&M Distributing in August through December 2000, 
the first five months M&M carried Squatters. Judge Medley held that such evidence was 
inadmissible under Rules 402 and 403 because (1) the evidence was not relevant on the 
issue of whether Carlson had used its best efforts and resources to promote and sell 
Squatters beer while Carlson was the distributor, and (2) any probative value of the evid= 
ence was outweighed by its potential to confuse the jury and to waste the court's time. 
(See Order Correcting Record on Appeal, Ex. B hereto.) 
Because a trial court is most familiar with the issues presented during a trial and 
the intricacies of the evidence that has been introduced and proffered, the trial court is 
given a great deal of latitude in determining whether evidence is relevant, or determining 
whether the probative value of any evidence is outweighed by the potential for confusion 
or needless delay. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, If 95, 37 P.3d 
1130 (trial court has "broad discretion in determining the relevance of proffered evid-
ence"); State v. Real Property at 633 E. 640 N„ 942 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1997) ("Trial 
courts have wide latitude in making determinations of relevance, probativeness, and 
prejudice under rules 401 and 403."). Judge Medley's plainly acted within his discretion. 
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1. Evidence of M&M's initial sales was not relevant to whether Carlson 
used its own best efforts in promoting and selling Squatters beer. 
The trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that evidence 
of M&M's initial sales of Squatters beer was not relevant to whether Carlson had used its 
best efforts to promote and sell the beer. Indeed, based on the plain meaning of the 
words "best," "efforts," and "resources," only two factors are relevant in determining 
whether Carlson satisfied its obligation: what efforts and resources Carlson used, and 
what efforts and resources Carlson could have used. If Carlson did not use all of the 
efforts and resources that it reasonably could have used to promote and sell Squatters 
beer, then Carlson breached the Agreement, regardless of how much beer M&M sold 
after Carlson was terminated. 
"'Best efforts' is a term 'which necessarily takes its meaning from the circum-
stances." Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citation 
omitted). In Bloor the plaintiff argued for the application of an objective standard to 
determine whether the defendant had used its "best efforts" to promote plaintiffs prod-
uct. The court in Bloor, however, found that "Falstaff did not contract to promote Ballan-
tine at the level or to the degree that Anheuser-Busch or Schlitz might have done. 
[Rather it] contracted] to merchandise Ballantine products in good faith and to the extent 
of its own total capabilities, and this it failed to do." Id. at 267. 
That Bloor used the phrase "average, prudent, [and] comparable brewer" does not 
affect the analysis. The key point of Bloor is that the proper focus of a "best efforts" 
determination is on the distributor's efforts, not necessarily on the distributor's results, 
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and the passages in Bloor referencing the "average" brewer were referring to the brewer's 
efforts. In the present case, however, Carlson was not seeking to introduce evidence of 
the efforts M&M made to promote and sell Squatters beer; instead, Carlson sought only 
to introduce evidence of M&M's sales results. 
Carlson did not promise to promote Squatters beer at the level or to the degree 
M&M or some other distributor would, but rather to the best of its own capabilities -
capabilities of which Squatters was aware and on which Squatters was depending when it 
entered into the Distribution Agreement. To determine whether Carlson used its own 
best efforts one must consider Carlson's abilities and resources and whether Carlson used 
those abilities and resources to promote the beer. See id M&M's subsequent success or 
failure as a distributor, particularly in the first few months it carried the beer,4 selling a 
different mix of products at a different time and in a different business climate, has no 
bearing on whether Carlson had previously used its best efforts. 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. This case was not 
about M&M's performance, but about Carlson's performance. M&M's sales data for the 
period when it first began selling Squatters is of no consequence to a determination of 
4
 Indeed, even if "comparative results" evidence were generally admissible on a 
"best efforts" analysis, several important differences between Carlson and M&M render 
Carlson's proposed comparison unreliable. Most importantly, Carlson was attempting to 
compare its sales during its fifth year of carrying Squatters beer to M&M's sales in the 
first few months it carried the brand. A distributor with years of experience selling a 
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whether Carlson, with its resources and abilities, used its best efforts to sell and promote 
Squatters beer during a prior period.5 
2. Judge Medley properly concluded that any probative value of the 
initial sales evidence would be outweighed by the confusion and 
time-wasting that would result. 
In addition to holding that evidence of M&M's initial sales of Squatters beer had 
no bearing on whether Carlson had used its own best efforts to promote the beer, Judge 
Medley also ruled that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the 
confusion it would cause and the time it would waste: 
Additionally, this Court concluded that the evidence plaintiff sought to 
admit was more likely to confuse the issues or mislead the jury in focusing 
on M&M Distributing's performance, and that if such evidence was 
admitted as sought by plaintiff, then defendants would necessarily have to 
introduce M&M Distributing5s full performance, and the surrounding facts 
and circumstances, all of which would unduly increase the time needed for 
trial and be an undue waste of time when balanced against the slight, if any, 
probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced by plaintiff. 
(Order Correcting Record on Appeal, Ex. B hereto.) 
certain product, with relationships already established with buyers, can be expected to 
have better results than a distributor just starting to carry the product. 
5
 The Court can reject Carlson's argument that the evidence was relevant because 
of the deposition testimony of Squatters' expert or because of Squatters' interrogatory 
answers. Most significantly, neither the testimony nor the interrogatory answers were 
used in evidence. Further, in quoting one sentence from Mr. Gary Fish's deposition, 
Carlson paints a highly misleading picture of Mr. Fish's testimony. In fact, when asked if 
he found it significant that the monthly average of sales was down 25% following the 
switch to M&M, Mr. Fish unequivocally stated, "No." (See Deposition of Gary D. Fish, 
R. 1422:23-24.) Mr. Fish found it insignificant because in his opinion it was natural for 
Carlson Distributing to maintain a certain share of the market during the transitional 
period due to wholesaler loyalty; in fact, the volume of Squatters beer sold by M&M has 
steadily increased since the initial period. 
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As noted above, a trial court has discretion in excluding evidence under Rule 403 
on the ground that the probative value of the evidence is "outweighed by the danger of 
. . . confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay 
[and] waste of time." Utah R. Evid. 403. Carlson has not even attempted to establish 
that Judge Medley clearly abused his discretion in reaching this conclusion. And the 
simple truth is that Carlson cannot demonstrate that Judge Medley abused his discretion, 
because Rule 403 requires a judgment call. Judge Medley was faced with evidence that, 
at best, was marginal, but with a great potential to be misleading, and Judge Medley 
properly realized that if Carlson were allowed to introduce that evidence, Squatters would 
have to be allowed to introduce evidence of M&M's increased sales in the periods after 
the initial few months. It was certainly permissible for Judge Medley to conclude that the 
potential for prejudice, and the need to waste substantial amounts of the jury's time if 
Carlson's evidence were introduced, outweighed any probative value of that evidence.6 
6
 Carlson also speculates that if evidence of M&M's initial sales had been intro-
duced, there would have been a more favorable outcome for Carlson. Because of space 
limitations, Squatters will not re-argue its case here. Suffice it to say, however, that 
Carlson has not established that the jury's ruling was a "close call." Indeed, Squatters 
introduced testimony from three witnesses who worked at restaurants that wished to sell 
Squatters beer, discussing the problems they had in getting Carlson to furnish and deliver 
the beer. (Trial Tr. Ill, R. 2429, at 421-447.) Additionally, the evidence showed that 
Carlson never put together a comprehensive marketing plan as required by the 
Distribution Agreement. (IdL at 468:8-10.) The jury unanimously found that Carlson had 
breached the best efforts provision of the Distribution Agreement and awarded Squatters 
every dollar that it sought on its counterclaim. There is no reason to believe that the 
result would have been any different if the evidence had been admitted. 
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D. Carlson is not entitled to any additional prejudgment interest. 
Carlson seeks prejudgment interest on an additional $3,404.92 ($294,022.56 
minus $290,617.64). Carlson is entitled to no additional interest, however. 
Prejudgment interest will not be awarded unless the party seeking the interest 
award demonstrates that the amount owed was calculable with mathematical certainty. 
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, ^ 24, 994 P.2d 817. A main purpose of awarding 
prejudgment interest is to deter parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is 
liquidated and owing. Id 
Indeed, the trial court should not have awarded any prejudgment interest at all, as 
Squatters had no obligation to pay the termination fee to Carlson until after Carlson paid 
all outstanding invoices to Squatters, and Carlson failed to pay Squatters. As explained 
in more detail in the "Cross-Appeal" section below, the Distribution Agreement gave 
Squatters an absolute right to receive payment of all outstanding invoices before it was 
obligated to pay Carlson a termination fee. Because Squatters did not receive that money 
until after the trial, there was no amount "owed" by Squatters to Carlson until after the 
trial. Thus, Squatters could not be liable for prejudgment interest. 
Even if prejudgment interest were appropriate, however, Carlson certainly is not 
entitled to any increase. Given Carlson's widely varying claims as to the amount of the 
termination fee, the only amount that could be said to be "liquidated" throughout the 
litigation is $290,617.64, the amount that Squatters stated in its Answer was the proper 
termination fee. Any amount above that figure remained in dispute until the jury 
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announced its verdict at the end of the trial. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court 
to conclude, in its discretion, that prejudgment interest was available only on that amount. 
E. The trial court properly concluded that Carlson was not entitled to attorney 
fees as the prevailing party, as Carlson failed on almost every claim and the 
only claim upon which it prevailed was not contested by Squatters. 
1. Carlson was not the prevailing party. 
A trial court's ruling as to who was the prevailing party will not be reversed 
unless the appellant establishes that the trial court abused its discretion. R.T. Nielson Co. 
v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, U 25, 40 P.3d 1119. Judge Medley clearly acted well within its 
discretion in determining that Carlson was not the prevailing party in the action. Before 
the trial court, the following things occurred: 
* Carlson sought a temporary restraining order that would have forced Squatters to 
continue distributing its products through Carlson. (Hr'g Tr., Aug. 9, 2000, R. 
2426.) Carlson failed. 
* Carlson sought a judgment of $182,444.50 against Squatters for damages for pre-
mature termination of the Distribution Agreement (the lost net profits claim). 
(PL's Trial Ex. 28.) Carlson failed. 
* Carlson sought a judgment against Squatters for damages for an allegedly 
improper price increase. (Trial Tr. V, R. 2431, at 797.) Carlson failed. 
* Carlson sought a judgment against Squatters for damages for allegedly interfering 
with Carlson's trademark rights. (Amended Complaint fflj 49-54, R. 458-59.) 
Carlson failed. 
* Carlson sought a judgment against Squatters under the Beer Industry Distribution 
Act. (Id H 64-71, R. 461.) Carlson failed. 
* Carlson attempted to obtain a termination fee from Squatters of $351,842.00, 
$323,096.00,8 $319,952.66,9 and $309,864.82.10 Carlson failed, failed, failed, and 
failed. 
7Defs.'TrialEx. 9, at 5. 
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* Carlson rejected two offers of judgment, for $300,000 (R. 2149-50) and for 
$405,000 (R. 2152-53), and sought more money at trial. Carlson failed. 
In light of these facts, Carlson cannot seriously claim that it "prevailed" in the 
action. Instead, Carlson overreached ~ and failed - nearly every step of the way. Carl-
son was successful on only two issues: (1) whether Carlson had a right to a termination 
fee under the Agreement, and (2) whether the fee was due right away. And only the sec-
ond issue was really contested, as Squatters stipulated more than a year before trial that 
Carlson had a right to a termination fee under the Agreement. (Stipulation, R. 776-77.) 
Conversely, Squatters was very successful. Squatters contended that the termin-
ation fee, if owed, was only $294,022.56, and the jury found this to be the proper fee. 
Squatters asked for $20,994.17 in damages on its counterclaim for Carlson's failure to 
use its best efforts, and the jury awarded Squatters exactly that amount. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that a trial court has 
flexibility in determining which party is the "prevailing" party in multiple-claim litig-
ation, and that, except in the run-of-the-mill case, it is often not possible to determine the 
prevailing party merely by looking at which party ended up with the "net judgment." See 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ffif 23-25, 40 P.3d 1119, Mountain States Broad-
casting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Mountain States, the Court 
explained that the prevailing party determination is "complicated" in cases "involving 
multiple claims and parties" and in cases "where the ultimate award of money damages 
8Defs.'TrialEx. 10. 
9
 Defs.'Trial Ex. 11, at 4. 
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does not adequately represent the actual success of the parties under the peculiar posture 
of the case." Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 556 n.7. The Court noted that such situations, 
among others, "demonstrate the need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in 
particular cases who actually is the 'prevailing party.5" Id. (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the court expressly disavowed the notion that "the net judgment rule can be 
mechanically applied in all cases." Id. at 557. In determining that the defendant was the 
prevailing party in that case, the Court analyzed in great detail each claim made by each 
party, the positions each party took regarding those claims, and each party's ultimate 
success in relation to its position. See id. at 558-59. 
The Utah Supreme Court expanded on the Mountain States analysis in R.T. 
Nielson. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court recognized that the prevailing 
party analysis was often complicated, that the matter must be left to the trial court's 
discretion, and that in some circumstances it will be appropriate to rule that neither party 
prevailed in an action: 
Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question for the 
trial court. This question depends, to a large measure, on the context of 
each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. We therefore review the trial court's 
determination as to who was the prevailing party under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Appropriate considerations for the trial court would 
include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2) the number of 
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties, (3) the 
importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the 
context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar aimounts 
attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. Based on 
these and other pertinent factors, the trial court is in a better position than 
we are as an appellate court to decide which party is the prevailing party. 
Trial Tr. V, R. 2431, at 796. 
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. . [T]he standard articulated above will permit a case-by-case evaluation 
by the trial court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or 
neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed. 
R.T. Nielson 1f 25, 40 P.3d 1119 (emphasis added). 
The trial court plainly did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Carlson was 
not the prevailing party. As shown by his extensive and detailed findings and con-
clusions (Exhibit D to Appellant's Brief), Judge Medley carefully considered the factors 
set forth in R.T. Nielson, along with "other pertinent factors," and concluded that neither 
side prevailed. Judge Medley considered each claim that was at issue in the lawsuit 
(Attorney Fee Findings 1-7), the outcome of each claim (Findings 8-20), the amount 
sought on Carlson's lost profits and termination fee claims (Findings 17-19), and the 
amount awarded on those claims (Finding 20). The trial court expressly found, based on 
the circumstances of the case, that the claims on which Carlson failed (and on which 
Squatters prevailed), were "important, significant claims." (Finding 24.) The trial court 
also expressly found that "the Plaintiffs net judgment rule victory [sic], while an 
important factor, is equal to in quality and significance to Defendants' victories on the 
claims that they were successful on in terms of the quality of the respective recoveries by 
the parties, the resources expended to accomplish those victories and their significance to 
the lawsuit as a whole." (Finding 25 (emphasis added).) Thus, the trial court found that 
"neither party is the sole, prevailing party because both parties won and lost significant 
claims and issues and when this case is considered as a whole, their respective victories 
and losses are equal or substantially equal, resulting in a specific finding from this Court 
that neither party is the prevailing party." (Finding 26.) 
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Judge Medley's careful consideration of all of the relevant factors is plainly en-
titled to substantial deference under R.T. Nielson. Judge Medley was in the best position 
to see what claims played a significant role in the litigation and which party (if any) 
actually "prevailed" on the litigation as a whole. Carlson has failed to present any com-
pelling reason for this Court to conclude that Judge Medley abused his discretion. 
The Court should be careful not to be misled by Carlson's claim that the present 
case is similar to R.T. Nielson, in which the party that won the net judgment was con-
sidered the prevailing party. Most importantly, the plaintiff in R.T. Nielson prevailed on 
the contested issues. The plaintiff sued Merrill Cook, seeking payment for political con-
sulting services, claiming that the parties' original written agreement had been verbally 
modified and that Cook breached the modified agreement. R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11, 
fflf 2-5, 40 P.3d 1119. The jury found for the plaintiff on both points and awarded more 
than $182,000, plus another $11,509 on a separate claim for unjust enrichment. Id. j^ 6. 
The only issue Cook prevailed on was a counterclaim for approximately $19,000. Id. 
Thus, the plaintiff "prevailed" on the significant contested issues, and there was no sug-
gestion that the plaintiff massively overstated its claims or rejected offers of judgment in 
excess of the amount ultimately received. 
As noted above, however, Carlson did not prevail on any contested issues in the 
present case, except on the issue of whether, and when, a termination fee was owed - and 
Squatters stipulated on the "whether" issue more than a year before the trial. The "how 
much" issue, and the remaining seven or eight issues, were resolved against Carlson. 
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The present case highlights exactly why it is so important for a trial court to have 
flexibility to determine whether a party actually "prevailed" for purposes of an attorney 
fee award. In the present case, Carlson had one legitimate claim, but motivated by spite 
and malice toward Squatters, overreached every step of the way. As the trial court rul-
ings and jury verdict demonstrated, Carlson brought a number of unsuccessful claims and 
sought an excessive award on the one claim that was successful. Moreover, Carlson rej-
ected two offers of judgment, both of which were more than Carlson ultimately received. 
Had Carlson accepted either offer, no trial would even have been necessary. 
Conversely, Squatters acted reasonably and appropriately: Squatters stipulated 
that it had breached the Distribution Agreement and that Carlson had a right to recover a 
termination fee, and Squatters attempted to settle the claim in good faith. Squatters did 
its best to avoid trial, but once the case did go to trial, Squatters prevailed on nearly every 
disputed issue. Squatters defeated Carlson's attempts to obtain an excessive termination 
fee, defeated Carlson's remaining claims, and prevailed on its own claim against Carlson, 
recovering every dollar it asked for. In other words, Squatters only "fought" when it was 
in the right and forced to do so by Carlson's intransigence. It would be a perversion of 
justice for Squatters to be forced to pay fees to Carlson. 
Finally, awarding Carlson fees would merely encourage malicious and wasteful 
litigation. Such an award would mean that as long as a party has one claim that is 
reasonably sure to succeed, the party has free rein to "shoot the moon," going for as much 
money as possible on that claim and running up fees and costs for all involved, because at 
the end of the day the client will automatically "prevail" on that claim and get its fees. 
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Giving one party such carte blanche would put the other party at a serious disadvantage 
and would frustrate the purpose of the civil litigation system, which is the "just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). 
2. If the Court determines that Carlson was the prevailing party, the 
matter must be remanded for an award limited to the issues on which 
Carlson was successful. 
The Court should reject Carlson's request that, if Carlson is deemed to be the 
prevailing party, Carlson "should receive a $115,000 fee award as the prevailing party." 
(Appellant's Br. at 47.) Contrary to Carlson's representation, the trial court did not rule 
that Carlson actually and reasonably incurred $115,000 in litigating the two issues on 
which Carlson prevailed: whether a fee was owed, and when the fee was owed. There-
fore, if Carlson is somehow found to be a prevailing party, the matter should be reman-
ded to Judge Medley to determine what fees were reasonably incurred on those issues. 
In its fee request, Carlson claimed that of the $258,081 in attorney fees it incurred 
in the action, fifty-seven percent, or $146,642, "were attributable to claims on which 
Carlson was successful." (Affidavit of Thomas R. Barton, ^[19, R. 1996; see also R. 
2089 (breakdown of fees).) Judge Medley, however, expressly rejected this testimony, 
finding that Carlson's claim was "excessive and unreasonable because it includes fees for 
issues that [] Carlson was unsuccessfiil on, beyond those issues which merely naturally 
overlap." (Attorney Fee Finding 32.) Additionally, the Court strongly rejected Carlson's 
claim that half of the fees incurred were attributable to the termination fee issue: 
Further, the Court finds that Carlson ys claim that 50% of the 
attorneys' time was spent on the termination fee issue, while not made in 
bad faith, to be incredfible], particularly when viewed in light of the 
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significance of the other claims lost by Carlson, including its claim for lost 
profits for premature breach of the distribution agreement, its breach of 
contract claim for increase in price, and the Defendants' best efforts 
counterclaim and the injunctive relief request. There is no way that 50% of 
the necessary time to try this case was spent on the termination fee issue. It 
is therefore also reasonable to assume that 50% of preparation time could 
not have been spent on the termination fee claim. 
(Finding 33 (emphasis added).) 
Carlson, of course, does not even acknowledge this finding. Instead, Carlson 
attempts to rely on Finding 34: 
The Court does find, however, that the Defendants' claim for fees in 
the amount of $115,000, as set forth in Defendants' affidavit in support of 
its[] motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs is more reasonable, 
conservative, and consistently satisfies all of the factors set forth in the 
Bracken case. Therefore, // the Court were to find that both parties pre-
vailed, which it is not finding, the reasonable fees awarded to each of the 
parties would be the sum of $115,000. 
(Finding 34 (emphasis added).) Carlson fails to inform this Court that Judge Medley's 
"$115,000 is reasonable for both sides" finding would apply only if both sides were found 
to be prevailing parties, which Judge Medley clearly stated was not the case.11 
In Finding 34, Judge Medley plainly intended that if his "no one prevailed" ruling 
were replaced by a "both sides prevailed" ruling, the attorney fees would cancel each 
other out. In fact, Judge Medley stated from the bench that "there's nothing in the evid-
ence that would warrant making an award to either party other than the same award in 
11
 In his oral ruling, Judge Medley emphasized this last point even further: 
"[E]ven if I were to find — and I want to emphasize again, in case something was unclear 
on this ~ I'm not so finding, but even if I were to find that the parties - that both parties 
were prevailing parties, I would find that reasonable fees would be awarded to both 
parties in the amount of $115,000." (Hr'g Tr., Nov. 4, 2002, R.2433, at 12-13 (emphasis 
added).) 
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the amount related to the supplemental request for fees as well" (Hr'g Tr., Nov. 4, 2000, 
R. 2433, at 13 (emphasis added).) Thus, Judge Medley clearly intended that neither party 
recover attorney fees from the other. 
It would be unreasonable to interpret Finding 34 as an implicit award of $115,000 
in fees to Carlson if Carlson were determined on appeal to be the sole prevailing party. 
As the finding itself shows, Judge Medley did not reach that figure based on Carlson's 
fee request, but rather on Squatters' fee request; Carlson's request was found to be exces-
sive, unreasonable, and not credible. Further, $115,000 represents forty-four percent of 
the total fees Carlson claims to have incurred in the entire litigation, but Judge Medley 
expressly recognized that the issues on which Carlson prevailed were only a minute part 
of that litigation. It would be unreasonable to think that Judge Medley actually intended 
to award Carlson forty-four percent of its total fees, simply for prevailing on those two 
issues. Finally, the Conclusions of Law reveal no indication that Carlson should be 
awarded anything in attorney fees. At the very least, Finding 34 is ambiguous, and if this 
Court were to determine that Carlson was indeed the prevailing party, the matter should 
be remanded to Judge Medley for a clarification. 
Indeed, if Judge Medley had intended to find that Carlson reasonably incurred 
$115,000 in attorney fees on the issues on which it was successful, then such a finding 
would be clearly erroneous. As noted previously, Carlson succeeded on only two issues: 
(1) whether a termination fee was owed - a matter to which Squatters stipulated in June 
2001, and (2) when the fee was owed. Additionally, Carlson's attorneys could hardly be 
considered "successful" even on these issues, given that Carlson twice rejected offers of 
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judgment in excess of the amount finally obtained. Moreover, Carlson's fee affidavit 
fails to specify what fees were incurred in pursuing these two issues (see Attorney Fee 
Affidavit, R. 1991-99), which itself justifies a refusal to award any fees, and there is 
simply no way those two issues accounted for forty-four percent of Carlson's total legal 
bill — over 600 hours of attorney time. Finally, the $115,000 figure came from Squatters' 
fee application, not Carlson's, and there is no basis to conclude that because that fee 
would be reasonable for Squatters, which prevailed on nearly every issue and attempted 
in good faith to settle the matter, the same amount would be reasonable for Carlson. 
The record contains no finding that Carlson actually incurred $115,000 in fees in 
litigating whether and when a termination fee was owed. And if those fees were not 
actually incurred on the two "successful" issues, then those fees could not be awarded on 
those issues. Nor does the record contain any findings that $115,000 would be a 
reasonable fee on those issues. And the record contains no findings on the Bracken 
factors as they apply to those issues. 
Thus, even if this Court were to determine that Carlson was the "prevailing party" 
under the Distribution Agreement, the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of (1) the amount of fees Carlson incurred in establishing that it had a right 
to a termination fee, and (2) the reasonableness of that amount. 
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PART TWO 
SQUATTERS' CROSS-APPEAL 
A. The trial court erred in calculating prejudgment interest from February 
2001, as the termination fee was not due until after Carlson paid all unpaid 
invoices owed to Squatters, and Squatters was not paid until August 2002. 
1. Carlson's payment into court did not satisfy its contractual 
obligation to pay and deliver to Squatters the amounts owed. 
The Distribution Agreement makes absolutely clear that Squatters would not owe 
Carlson a termination fee until after Carlson paid its outstanding obligations to Squatters: 
Termination Fee. In the event Brewer elects not to renew the initial term or 
any successive one-year term of this Agreement under Section 3(b) hereof, 
Brewer shall pay to Distributor as liquidated damages and Distributor's sole 
remedy for such non-renewal (except for any additional amounts payable 
under Section 4(c) hereof), a termination fee which shall be due within 
thirty days from Distributor's payment (if any) and delivery to Brewer of 
the amounts and property required to be paid or delivered under Section 
4(c) hereof. 
(Distribution Agreement f 4(d) (bold in original; italics added).) It is undisputed that 
when Squatters terminated the Distribution Agreement, Carlson owed Squatters 
$12,992.74 in unpaid invoices. (PL's Trial Ex. 39.) It is also undisputed that Carlson did 
not pay this money to Squatters. (Trial Tr. II, R. 2428, at 175-76.) Instead, to prevent 
Squatters from enjoying the benefit of funds to which Squatters was clearly entitled, 
Carlson unilaterally decided to pay that amount into the trial court, even though Squatters 
did not stipulate to the deposit and no order authorized such a deposit under Rule 67. CI 
Utah R. Civ. P. 67 (authorizing court to "order" payment into court, "upon motion"). In 
fact, Carlson never even moved for an order under Rule 67. 
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Payment into court clearly did not satisfy Carlson's obligation under paragraph 
4(d) of the Agreement, which expressly required "payment ... and delivery to Brewer" 
before a termination fee would be due. (Distribution Agreement j^ 4(d) (emphasis 
added).) If the parties had intended the payment from Carlson to be used merely as an 
offset against the termination fee, they could easily have said so. Instead, the Distribution 
Agreement clearly requires the outstanding invoices to be paid off first. Then, and only 
then, would Squatters be required to pay the termination fee — thirty days later. 
Squatters received absolutely no benefit from Carlson's payment into court. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4(l)(b) (money paid into court is subject to court control). 
Indeed, that was precisely the point of Carlson's decision to pay the money into court: 
To make it look like Carlson was satisfying its obligations, while at the same time deny-
ing Squatters the money. And the plain language of the Distribution Agreement makes 
absolutely clear that because Squatters did not receive the use of those funds until August 
23, 2002 (after the trial), Squatters was under no obligation whatsoever to pay Carlson a 
termination fee until thirty days later, or September 22, 2002. Accordingly, because 
Carlson had no legal right to the termination fee until September 22, 2002, the trial court 
erred in calculating prejudgment interest from February 24, 2001. (See Order on Pre-
judgment Interest, Dec. 4, 2002, at 7, R. 2356, Appellant's Br. Ex. E.)12 
Because it was undisputed that Squatters had not received the $12,992.74 from 
Carlson by the time of trial, the trial court should have granted Squatters' motion for a 
directed verdict on the termination fee claim. Because Squatters was finally paid in 
August 2002, however, Squatters' objection to the portion of the judgment awarding 
Carlson the termination fee is moot. In fact, Squatters has tendered full payment of the 
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2. The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Squatters had 
waived the right to compliance with the Agreement. 
Instead of ruling on whether Carlson's payment of the invoice amount into court 
satisfied its "payment and delivery" obligation, the trial court held that Squatters waived 
the right to insist on compliance with the plain language of the Distribution Agreement, 
because Squatters did not explicitly object to the payment of the funds into court. (See 
id. at 3-6, R. 2353-55.) This ruling was incorrect, however. 
In the seminal Utah case on waiver, the Utah Supreme Court made clear that a 
party will not be deemed to have waived a contractual right unless the evidence estab-
lishes that the party "intentionally" relinquished that right. Soter's, Ince v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). The intent to waive must be 
"distinct." IcL The requirement that relinquishment be intentional and distinct "ensure[s] 
that waiver [may] not be found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly 
intended." Id. at 940 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stressed that "mere silence is not a waiver 
unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." Id, (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Div. 
of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added; brackets 
and internal punctuation omitted). Moreover, "[i]t is generally accepted that a duty to 
speak will not be found where the contracting parties deal at arm's length, and where the 
underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under such cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself and to 
termination fee to Carlson, but Carlson, once again, refused to accept the tender and end 
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protect his own interests." Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 72-73 (Utah 1998) (first 
emphasis added, second in original) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). If the 
underlying facts are undisputed, whether a waiver occurred presents a question of law. 
Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food Service, 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Squatters ever manifested an 
intent to excuse Carlson from paying the invoice amount, or that Squatters ever indicated 
that it would pay the termination fee to Carlson even though Carlson failed to pay the 
invoice amount to Squatters. Instead, the only support that either Carlson or the trial 
court cited for finding waiver was that Squatters did not expressly object to Carlson's 
failure to pay the invoice amount, did not move for release of the money, and did not 
raise the issue in response to a summary judgment motion Carlson filed. (See Pre-
judgment Interest Order at 3-6.) 
Utah law is clear, however, that one contracting party is under no duty to tell the 
other party that he or she has breached a contract, or to remind the other party of the 
other's contractual obligations. See Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 72. In Geisdorf, a tenant tried 
to exercise a lease option verbally, when the lease required a written exercise. The trial 
court entered judgment for the tenant, but the supreme court reversed, holding that the 
landlord had no duty to inform the tenant that the renewal had to be in writing: 
Geisdorf attempts to make much of the fact that Doughty did not request a 
written notice of intent to renew before July 15, 1995 [after the renewal 
deadline had passed]. However, both parties, as signatories, had copies of 
the Lease Agreement to which they could refer\ the requirement of written 
notice was thus "reasonably within the knowledge of both parties." 
the litigation, choosing instead to continue to pursue its vendetta against Squatters. 
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[Citation.] Doughty had no duty to remind Geisdorf of the necessity to 
exercise the option by written notice. Geisdorf was responsible to keep 
himself informed about the continuing provisions under the Lease 
Agreement and to protect his interests, both current and future, in the leased 
property. 
Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
Geisdorf s reasoning controls here. As with the tenant in Geisdorf, Carlson had a 
copy of the Distribution Agreement and is thus charged with knowledge that the Agree-
ment required the invoice amount to be both paid and delivered to Squatters before any 
termination fee would be due. Moreover, Geisdorf confirms that Squatters "had no duty 
to remind" Carlson that payment into court was insufficient under the Agreement. 
Similarly, that Squatters did not ask the Court to release the funds prior to trial 
does not support a finding of waiver; indeed, this is no different from the landlord's 
failure on Geisdorf to ask the tenant to exercise the option in writing. Further, it would 
violate the plain language of the Distribution Agreement for Squatters to be forced to 
chase after the money that Carlson chose to pay someone else. Once again, the Distrib-
ution Agreement clearly required Carlson to pay and deliver the funds to Squatters, It 
would stand this obligation on its head to say that Carlson could pay the money to a third 
person, and that Squatters was required to go get it. Moreover, when Squatters did 
request that the funds be released, Carlson objected, claiming that the funds had to be 
kept in reserve to be "applied to any offset." (Trial Tr. V, R. 2431, at 767.) Thus, having 
denied that Squatters had a right to release of the funds, Carlson cannot claim that 
Squatters waived its right to the funds by failing to move for their release sooner. 
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As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Soter's, a court must be especially cautious in 
finding waiver from silence, to ensure that a party is not held to have waived a con-
tractual right unless the party intended to do so. This is why only a "distinct" intent to 
waive will suffice. Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942. Here, Judge Medley's findings do not 
reveal a "distinct" intent by Squatters to waive its right under the Distribution Agreement 
to receive full payment of the invoice amount before having to pay a termination fee.13 
B. The trial court erred in failing to award Squatters the attorney fees incurred 
in successfully defending against Carlson's Distribution Act claim. 
As discussed above, Carlson stated a claim against Squatters under the Utah Beer 
Industry Distribution Act, seeking "reasonable compensation for Carlson's loss of the 
Squatters Beer brand" and attorney fees. (Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief^ B, R. 
462.) As noted above, Squatters obtained a directed verdict on that claim. Squatters is 
therefore entitled to fees, as the Act states that "[t]he prevailing party in any action under 
[the Distribution Act] shall recover . . . ft}] reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs." 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1 la-110(2)(a)(ii). 
The trial court concluded that neither party was the "prevailing party." As applied 
to the Distribution Act claim, however, such a conclusion is completely unwarranted and 
The trial court also concluded that Squatters waived its right to payment of the 
outstanding invoices as a prerequisite to the termination fee because Squatters did not 
raise the issue in response to Carlson's motion for partial summary judgment. (Prejudg-
ment Interest Finding 8, Conclusion 1(c), R. 2352, 2354, Appellant's Br. Ex. E.) This 
finding is not entirely correct, however, because Squatters did object to Carlson's claim 
that payment into court satisfied its 4(d) obligations. (See R. 647.) Moreover, there is no 
support for Carlson's position that a party's choice not to raise a particular argument in 
an opposition memorandum — on a motion that the court never even ruled on 
constitutes waiver of a substantive contractual right. 
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constitutes an abuse of discretion. Carlson brought the Distribution Act claim, and Carl-
son got nothing; Squatters therefore prevailed. Squatters may or may not have prevailed 
on the other claims in the action, but there is no doubt that Squatters prevailed on the 
Distribution Act claim, and as such is entitled to attorney fees under the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., and Utah 
Brewers Cooperative, L.C., hereby request that the Court vacate the award of pre-
judgment interest to Carlson and remand the matter to the trial court to award Salt Lake 
Brewing and Utah Brewers Cooperative the attorney fees reasonably incurred in defen-
ding against Carlson's Beer Industry Distribution Act claim. Salt Lake Brewing Co. and 
Utah Brewers Cooperative also request that the trial court be instructed to award them 
costs and attorney fees incurred on this appeal pursuant to the Distribution Agreement 
and Utah Code Ann. § 32A-lla-110(2)(a)(ii). In all other respects, the judgments and 
orders of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED: August IX, 2003. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
jutv*— 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Stephen P. Horvat 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-
Appellants Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. and 
Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of the law firm of Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 
West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that on August 22, 2003, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF to be served, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, upon: 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas R. Barton 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross Appellee 
^Jfattfr-
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Exhibit A 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1 la-110(2)(a) 
The prevailing party in any action under Subsection (1) shall recover: 
(i) actual damages, including the value of the wholesaler's 
business as specified in Section 32A-lla-108 if applicable; and 
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
Utah R.Evid. 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Exhibit B 
John P. Ashton (0314) 
Thomas R. Barton (6827) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE BREWING, CO., L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, and UTAH BREWERS 
COOPERATIVE, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
ORDER CORRECTING RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 000906096 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Plaintiff's Motion to Admit Evidence Regarding Subsequent sales of Squatters 
Beer ("Plaintiffs Motion") was heard by the Court on July 25, 2002. Plaintiff was 
represented by John P. Ashton and Thomas R. Barton. Defendants were represented by 
Thomas R. Karrenberg and Scott A. Call. The Court considered the legal memoranda of 
YEATES 
1AHLER 
bosolth00 the parties and the arguments of counsel, and ruled by telephone on July 29, 2002. 
ceCity 
4111 
The Court denied Plaintiffs Motion on grounds of relevancy, because the 
evidence plaintiff sought to admit focused on post-termination sales data of M&M 
Distributing under different conditions and circumstances. Additionally, this Court 
concluded that the evidence plaintiff sought to admit was more likely to confuse the issues 
or mislead the jury in focusing on M&M Distributingf s performance, and that if such 
evidence was admitted as sought by plaintiff, then defendants would necessarily have to 
introduce M&M Distributingfs full performance, and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, all of which would unduly increase the time needed for trial and be an undue 
waste of time when balanced against the slight, if any, probative value of the evidence 
sought to be introduced by plaintiff. 
However, this ruling is not reflected in the Record on Appeal in this action. 
Based on the foregoing and Plaintiffs Motion for Correction of Record on 
Appeal, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk supplement the Record on Appeal by 
adding this Order Correcting Record on Appeal, to the Record on Appeal, and certifying 
and transmitting the Supplemental Record on Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
forthwith, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h). 
CE, YEATES 
:LDZAHLER 
itre I, Suite 900 
ast 400 South 
t Lake City 
hah Rd111 
DATED this day of 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
lomas Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (A day of August, 2003, I caused to be mailed, 
first class postage thereon, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER 
CORRECTING RECORD ON APPEAL to the following: 
Thomas Karrenberg, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
G \Jab\Carlson DistnbutingYThird District Court Case\order cor of record on appeal wpd 
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